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Abstract
Recently four different papers have suggested that the supervaluational
solution to the Problem of the Many is ﬂawed. Stephen Schiffer (1998,
2000a,b) has argued that the theory cannot account for reports of speech
involving vague singular terms. Vann McGee and Brian McLaughlin
(2000) say that theory cannot, yet, account for vague singular beliefs.
Neil McKinnon (2002) has argued that we cannot provide a plausible the-
ory of when precisiﬁcations are acceptable, which the supervaluational
theory needs. And Roy Sorensen (2000) argues that supervaluationism
is inconsistent with a directly referential theory of names. McGee and
McLaughlin see the problem they raise as a cause for further research,
but the other authors all take the problems they raise to provide sufﬁ-
cient reasons to jettison supervaluationism. I will argue that none of
these problems provide such a reason, though the arguments are valu-
able critiques. In many cases, we must make some adjustments to the
supervaluational theory to meet the posed challenges. The goal of this
paper is to make those adjustments, and meet the challenges.
1 Schiffer’s Problem
Stephen Schiffer suggests the following argument refutes supervaluationism. The
central point is that, allegedly, the supervaluational theory of vague singular terms
says false things about singular terms in speech reports.
Pointing in a certain direction, Alice says to Bob, ‘There is where Harold
and I ﬁrst danced the rumba.’ Later that day, while pointing in the same
direction, Bob says to Carla, ‘There is where Alice said she and Harold
ﬁrst danced the rumba.’ Now consider the following argument:
(1) Bob’s utterance was true.
(2) If the supervaluational semantics were correct, Bob’s utterance
wouldn’t be true.
(3) © The supervaluational semantics isn’t correct. (Schiffer, 2000a,
321)
Assuming Bob did point in pretty much the same direction as Alice, it seems im-
plausible to deny (1). The argument is valid. So the issue is whether (2) is correct.
Schiffer has a quick argument for (2), which I will paraphrase here. On supervalu-
ational semantics, a sentence is true iff each of its acceptable precisiﬁcations is true.
† Penultimate draft only. Please cite published version if possible. Final version published in Philo-
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In this case, this means that if Bob’s utterance is true then it must be true however
we precisify ‘there’. Each precisiﬁcation of ‘there’ will be a (precise) place, and since
‘there’ is rather vague, many of these precisiﬁcations will be acceptable. For Bob’s
utterance to be true, then, Alice must have said of every one of those places that it
was the place where Harold and her ﬁrst danced the rumba. But Alice couldn’t have
said all those things, so (2) is true.
Schiffer suggests that one way out of this problem would be to accept the exis-
tence of a vague object: the place where Harold and Alice ﬁrst danced the rumba. I
will note in section four several reasons for thinking the cost of this move is excessive.
Fortunately, there is a cheaper way home.
Schiffer underestimates the scope of supervaluationism. On Schiffer’s vision of
the theory, a precisiﬁcation assigns a precise content to a word, and hence to a sen-
tence, thentheworlddetermineswhetherthatcontentissatisﬁed, andhencewhether
the sentence is true on that precisiﬁcation. This is hardly an unorthodox view of
how supervaluationism works, it seems for instance to be exactly the view defended
in Keefe (2000), but it is neither the only way, nor the best way, forward. We could
say, rather, that a precisiﬁcation assigns content to every linguistic token in the world,
and the truth conditions of every one of these tokens is then determined relative to
that global assignment of content. So if a precisiﬁcation P assigns a place x to Bob’s
word ‘there’, Bob’s utterance is true according to that precisiﬁcation iff P also assigns
x to Alice’s utterance of ‘there’. That is, Bob’s utterance is true according to P iff the
precisiﬁcation of his words by P just is what Alice said according to P.1
It is a dramatic widening of the scope of precisiﬁcations to claim that they as-
sign content to every linguistic token in the world, rather than just words in the
sentence under consideration, but it can be justiﬁed.2 Consider how we would react
if later in the day, pointing in the crucial direction, Alice said, ‘Harold and I never
danced the rumba there.’ We would think that Alice had contradicted herself – that
between her two statements she must have said something false. A standard super-
valuationist account, where sentences are precisiﬁed one at a time, cannot deliver
this result. On such a view, it might be that each of Alice’s utterances are true on
some precisiﬁcations, so they are both neither true nor false. On my theory, each
precisiﬁcation applies to both of Alice’s utterances (as well as every other utterance
ever made) and since on each precisiﬁcation one or other of the utterances is false,
it turns out supertrue that Alice said something false, as desired. The current view
allows for penumbral connections between sentences, as well as penumbral connec-
tions within sentences. Just as someone who says, “That is red and orange” says
something false, my theory decrees that someone who says, “That is red. That is
orange,” while pointing at the same thing says something false, even if the object is in
the vague area ‘between’ red and orange.
It is crucial for this response to work that on every precisiﬁcation, Alice and
Bob’s demonstratives are co–referential. It does not seem like a particular expansion
of supervaluational theory to posit this as a penumbral connection between the two
1Following Schiffer, we ignore the vagueness in ‘is where Harold and I ﬁrst danced the rumba.’ This
phrase is vague, but its vagueness raises no extra issues of philosophical importance.
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words. At least, it seems plausible enough to do this if Alice and Bob really are point-
ing in a similar direction. If their demonstrations are only roughly co-directional,
then on some precisiﬁcations they may well pick out different objects. This will deﬁ-
nitely happen if some admissible precisiﬁcation of Alice’s ‘there’ is not an admissible
precisiﬁcation of Bob’s ‘there’. In such a case, the theory here predicts that Bob’s
utterance will be indeterminate in truth value. But if Alice and Bob only vaguely
pointed in the same direction this is the correct prediction.
2 Natural Properties
Schiffer’s problem seems to have been solved with a minimum of fuss, but there is
still a little work to do. Above I posited a penumbral connection between Alice’s
and Bob’s words without explaining how such a connection could arise. This con-
nection can be explained by some general considerations about content, considera-
tions closely tied to the view of vagueness as semantic indecision that provides the
best motivation for supervaluationism. As a few writers have pointed out (Quine,
1960; Putnam, 1980; Kripke, 1982), there is not enough in our dispositions to use
words to ﬁx a precise content all terms in our lexicon. This does not immediately im-
ply a thorough-going content scepticism because, as a few writers have also pointed
out (Putnam, 1973; Kripke, 1980; Lewis, 1983, 1984), meanings ain’t (entirely) in
the head. Sometimes our words refer to a particular property or object rather than
another not because our dispositions make this so, but because of some particular
feature of that property or object. David Lewis calls this extra feature ‘naturalness’:
some properties and objects are more natural than others, and when our verbal dis-
positions do not discriminate between different possible contents, naturalness steps
in to ﬁnish the job and the more natural property or object gets to be the content.
Well, that’s what happens when things go well. Vagueness happens when things
don’t go well. Sometimes our verbal dispositions are indiscriminate between several
different contents, and no one of these is more natural than all the rest. In these
cases there will be many unnatural contents not eliminated by our dispositions that
naturalness does manage to eliminate, but there will be still be many contents left
uneliminated. Consider, for example, all the possible properties we might denote by
‘tall woman’. As far as our usage dispositions go, it might denote any one of the fol-
lowing properties: woman taller than 1680mm, woman taller than 1681mm, woman
taller than 1680.719mm, etc. And it does not seem that any of these properties are
more natural than any other. Hence there is no precise fact about what the phrase
denotes. Hence it is vague. In sum, our dispositions are never enough to settle the
content of a term. In some cases, such as ‘water’, ‘rabbit’, ‘plus’, ‘brain’ and ‘vat’, na-
ture is kind enough to, more or less, ﬁnish the job. In others it is not, and vagueness
is the result.
(The above reasoning has a surprising consequence. Perhaps our verbal disposi-
tions are consistent with the predicate Tall X denoting the property of being in the
top quartile of Xs by height. Unlike each of the properties mentioned in the text, this
is a more natural property than many of its competitors. So if this kind of approach
to vagueness is right, there might not be quite as much vagueness as we expected.)Many Many Problems 4
If this is how vagueness is created, then there is a natural way to understand how
precisiﬁcations remove vagueness. Vagueness arises because more natural than is a
partial order on putative contents, and hence there might be no most natural content
consistent with our verbal dispositions. If this relation only deﬁned a strict order-
ing, so whatever the candidate meanings were, one of them would be most natural,
vagueness might be defeated. Well, that isn’t true in reality, but it is true on each pre-
cisiﬁcation. Every precisiﬁcation is a completion of the ‘naturalness’ partial order.
That is, each precisiﬁcation P deﬁnes a strict order, more natural-P than, on possible
contents of terms such that o1 is more natural-P than o2 if (but not only if) o1 is more
natural than o2. The particular contents of terms according to P is then deﬁned by
using the more natural-P than relation where the more natural than relation is used
in the real theory of content.
This conjecture meshes nicely with my theory of the role of precisiﬁcations.
First, it explains why precisiﬁcations apply to the whole of language. Since a pre-
cisiﬁcation does not just remedy a defect in a particular word, but a defect in the
content generation mechanism, precisiﬁcations are most naturally applied not just
to a single word, but to every contentful entity. Secondly, it explains why we have
the particular penumbral connections we actually have. Recall that it was left a lit-
tle unexplained above why Alice’s and Bob’s use of ‘there’ denoted the same precise
place. On the current conjecture, Alice’s term refers to a particular place x accord-
ing to P because x is more natural–P than all the other places to which Alice might
have referred. If this is so, then x will be more natural–P than all the other places
to which Bob might have referred, so it will also be the referent according to P of
Bob’s there. Hence according to every precisiﬁcation, Bob’s utterance will be true,
as Schiffer required.
We can also explain some other unexplained penumbral connections by appeal
to naturalness. Consider the sentence David Chalmers is conscious. Unless this is su-
pertrue, supervaluationism is in trouble. It is vague just which object is denoted by
David Chalmers. On every precisiﬁcation, there are other objects that massively over-
lap David Chalmers. Indeed, these very objects are denoted by ‘David Chalmers’ on
other precisiﬁcations. These objects are not conscious, since if one did there would
be two conscious objects where, intuitively, there is just one. But each of these rogue
objects must be in the extension of ‘conscious’ on the precisiﬁcations where it is the
denotation of ‘David Chalmers’. So ‘conscious’ must be vague in slightly unexpected
ways, and there must be a penumbral connection between it and ‘David Chalmers’:
on every precisiﬁcation, whatever object is denoted by that name is in the extension
of ‘conscious’, while no other potential denotata of ‘David Chalmers’ is in the ex-
tension. How is this penumbral connection to be explained? Not by appeal to the
meanings of the terms! Even if ‘David Chalmers’ has descriptive content, it is highly
implausible that this includes being conscious. (After all, unless medicine improves
a bit in a thousand years Chalmers will not be conscious.) Rather, this penumbral
connection is explained by the fact that the very same thing, naturalness, is used in
resolving the vagueness in the terms ‘conscious’ and ‘David Chalmers’. If the pre-
cisiﬁcation makes one particular possible precisiﬁcation of ‘David Chalmers’, say d1,
more natural than another, d2, then it will make properties satisﬁed by d1­ moreMany Many Problems 5
natural than those satisﬁed by d2, so every precisiﬁcation will make the denotation
of ‘David Chalmers’ fall into the extension of ‘conscious’.
We can say the same thing about Alice’s original statement: That is where Harold
and I ﬁrst danced the rumba. Since one can’t ﬁrst dance the rumba with Harold in two
different places, it seems Alice’s statement can’t be true relative to more than one
precisiﬁcation of ‘That’. But really the phrase after ‘is’ is also vague, and there is a
penumbral connection (via naturalness) between it and the demonstrative. Hence we
can say Alice’s statement is supertrue without appealing to any mysterious penumbral
connections.
3 McGee and McLaughlin’s Challenge
Vann McGee and Brian McLaughlin (2000) raise a challenge for supervlauational ap-
proaches to the Problem of the Many that uses belief reports in much the way that
Schiffer’s problem uses speech reports. They fear that without further development,
thesupervaluationaltheorycannotdistinguishbetweenthedereanddedictoreadings
of (4).
(4) Ralph believes that there is a snow-capped mountain within sight of the equa-
tor.
They claim, correctly, that (4) should have both a de dicto reading and a de re reading,
where in the latter case it is a belief about Kilimanjaro. The problem with the latter
case is unclear how Ralph’s belief can be about Kilimanjaro itself. To press the point,
they consider an atom at or around the base of Kilimanjaro, called Sparky, and deﬁne
“Kilimanjaro(+) to be the body of land constituted ... by the atoms that make up
Kilimanjaro together with Sparky [and] Kilimanjaro(-) [to] be the body of land con-
stituted ... by the atoms that make up Kilimanjaro other than Sparky.” (129) The
problem with taking (4) to be true on a de re reading is that “there isn’t anything,
either in his mental state or in his neural state or in his causal relations with his en-
vironment that would make one of Kilimanjaro(+) and Kilimanjaro(-), rather than
the other, the thing that Ralph’s belief is about.” (146) So if the truth of (4) on a de
re reading requires that Ralph believes a singular, or object-dependent, proposition,
about one of Kilimanjaro(+) and Kilimanjaro(-), then (4) cannot be true. Even worse,
if the truth of (4) requires that Ralph both that Ralph believes a singular proposition
about Kilimanjaro(+), that it is a snow-capped mountain within sight of the equator,
and the same proposition about Kilimanjaro(-), then given some knowledge about
mountains on Ralph’s part, (4) cannot be true, because that would require Ralph to
mistakenly believe there are two mountains located roughly where Kilimanjaro is
located.
We should not be so easily dissuaded. It is hard to identify exactly which features
of Ralph’s “mental state or neural state or causal relations with his environment”
that make it the case that he believes that two plus two equals four, but does not
believe that two quus two equals four. (I assume Ralph is no philosopher, so lacks
the concept QUUS.) I doubt, for example, that the concept PLUS has some causalMany Many Problems 6
inﬂuence over Ralph that the concept QUUS lacks. But Ralph does have the belief
involving PLUS, and not the belief involving QUUS. He has this belief not merely in
virtue of his mental or neural states, or his causal interactions with his environment,
but in virtue of the fact that PLUS is a more natural concept than QUUS, and hence
is more eligible to be a constituent of his belief.
So if Kilimanjaro(+) is more natural than Kilimanjaro(-), it will be a constituent
of Ralph’s belief, despite the fact that there is no other reason to say his belief is about
one rather than the other. Now, in reality Kilimanjaro(+) is no more natural than
Kilimanjaro(-). But according to any precisiﬁcation, one of them will be more natural
than the other, for precisiﬁcations determine content by determining relative natural-
ness. Hence if Ralph has a belief with the right structure, in particular a belief with
a place for an object (roughly, Kilimanjaro) and the property being within sight of the
equator, then on every precisiﬁcation he has a singular belief that a Kilimanjaro-like
mountain is within sight of the equator. And notice that since naturalness determines
both mental content and verbal content, on every precisiﬁcation the constituent of
that belief will be the referent of ‘Kilimanjaro’. So even on a de re reading, (4) will be
true.
Schiffer’s problem showed that we should not take precisiﬁcations to be deﬁned
merely over single sentences. McGee and McLaughlin’s problem shows that we
should take precisiﬁcations to set the content not just of sentences, but of mental
states as well. Precisiﬁcations do not just assign precise content to every contentful
linguistic token, but to every contentful entity in the world, including beliefs. This
makes the issue of penumbral connections that we discussed in section two rather
pressing. We already noted the need to establish penumbral connections between
separate uses of demonstratives. Now we must establish penumbral connections be-
tween words and beliefs. The idea that precisiﬁcations determine content by deter-
mining relative naturalness establishes these connections.
To sum up, McGee and McLaughlin raise three related problems concerning de re
belief. Two of these concern belief reports. First, how can we distinguish between de
re and de dicto reports? If I am right, we can distinguish between these just the way
Russell suggested, by specifying the scope of the quantiﬁers. McGee and McLaughlin
suspect this will not work because in general we cannot argue from (5) to (6), given
the vagueness of ‘Kilimanjaro’.
(5) Kilimanjaro is such that Ralph believes it to be within sight of the equator.
(6) There is a mountain such that Ralph believes it to be within sight of the equa-
tor.
Whether or not we want to accept a semantics in which we must restrict existential
generalisation in this way as a general rule, we can give an independent argument
that (6) is true whenever (4) is true on a de re reading (i.e. whenever (5) is true). The
argument is just that on every precisiﬁcation, the subject of Ralph’s salient singular
belief is a mountain, so (6) is true on every precisiﬁcation. This argument assumes
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say the referent of ‘Kilimanjaro’ in his language of thought3, and the word ‘moun-
tain’. But since we have already established that there is such a connection between
‘Kilimanjaro’ in his language of thought and ‘Kilimanjaro’ in public language, and
there is obviously a connection between ‘Kilimanjaro’ in public language and the
word ‘mountain’, as ‘Kilimanjaro is a mountain’ is supertrue, this assumption is safe.
So the second puzzle McGee and McLaughlin raise, how it can be that the relevant
de re reports can be true, has also been addressed.
There is a third puzzle McGee and McLaughlin raise that the reader might think I
have not addressed. How can it be that Ralph can actually have a de re belief concern-
ing Kilimanjaro? I have so far concentrated on belief reports, not merely on beliefs,
and my theory has relied crucially on correlations between the vagueness in these
reports and the vagueness in the underlying belief. It might be thought that I have
excluded the most interesting case, the one where Ralph has a particular belief with
Kilimanjaro itself as a constituent. While I will end up denying Ralph can have such
a belief, I doubt this a problematic feature of my view. The theory outlined here de-
nies that Ralph has object–dependent beliefs, but not that he has de re beliefs. I deny
that Ralph has a belief that has Kilimanjaro(+) as a constituent, but it is hard to see
how Ralph could have such a belief, since it very hard to see how he could have had
a belief that has Kilimanjaro(+) rather than Kilimanjaro(-) as its subject. (This was
McGee and McLaughlin’s fundamental point.) If we think that having a de re belief
implies having a belief whose content is an object–dependent proposition, then we
must deny that there are de re beliefs about Kilimanjaro. Since there is no object that
is determinately a constituent of the proposition Ralph believes, it is a little hard to
maintain that he believes an object–dependent proposition.4 But this is not the only
way to make sense of de re beliefs.
Robin Jeshion has argued that whether a belief is de re depends essentially on its
role in cognition. “What distinguishes de re thought is its structural or organisational
role in thought” (Jeshion, 2002, 67)5 I won’t rehearse Jeshion’s arguments here, just
their more interesting conclusions. We can have de re beliefs about an object iff we
have a certain kind of mental ﬁle folder for the object. This folder need not be gen-
erated by acquaintance with the object, so acquiantanceless de re belief is possible.
Indeed, the folder could have been created defectively, so there is no object that the
information in the folder is about.6 In this case, the contents of the folder are sub-
jectless de re beliefs. Jeshion doesn’t discuss this, but presumably the folder must not
have been created purely to be the repository for information about the bearer of a
certain property, whoever or whatever that is. We have to rule out this option if we
follow Szabó (2000) in thinking the folder metaphor plays a crucial role in explaining
3I do not mean here to commit myself to anything like the language of thought hypothesis. This is just
being used as a convenient shorthand.
4This is hard, but not perhaps impossible. One might say that on every precisiﬁcation, Ralph believes
a proposition that has a mountain as a constituent, and hence as an essential part.
5I don’t know if Jeshion would accept the corollary that if belief is too unstructured to allow for the
possibility of such organisational roles, then there is no de re belief, but I do.
6Which is not just to say that there is no object that has all the properties in the folder. This is neither
necessary nor sufﬁcient for the folder to be about the object, as Kripke’s discussion of ‘famous deeds’
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our talk and thought involving descriptions. Provided the folder was created with the
intent that it record information about some object, rather than merely information
about whatever object has a particular property, its contents are de re beliefs. (To al-
low for distinct folders ‘about’ non-existent objects, we must allow that it is possible
that such folders do have their reference ﬁxed by their contents, but as long as this
was not the intent in creation these folders can sufﬁce for de re belief. This point
lets us distinguish between my folder for Vulcan and my folder for The planet causing
the perturbations of Mercury. Both are individuated by the fact that they contain the
proposition This causes the perturbations of Mercury. It is this feature of the folder
that ﬁxes their reference, or in this case their non-reference. Only in the latter case,
however, was this the intent in creating the folder, so its contents are de dicto beliefs,
while the contents of the former are de re beliefs.)
Now we have the resources to show how Ralph can have de re beliefs concerning
Kilimanjaro. When Ralph hears about it, or sees it, he opens a ﬁle folder for Kiliman-
jaro. This is not intended to merely be a folder for the mountain he just heard about,
or saw. It is intended to be a folder for that. (Imagine here that I am demonstrating
the mountain in question.) The Kripkenstein point about referential indeterminacy
applies to folders as much as to words. This point is closely related to Kripke’s insis-
tence that his indeterminacy argument does not rely on behaviourism. So if Ralph’s
folder is to have a reference, it must be ﬁxed in part by the naturalness of various
putative referents. But that is consistent with Ralph’s folder containing de re beliefs,
since unless Ralph is a certain odd kind of philosopher, he will not have in his folder
that Kilimanjaro is peculiarly eligible to be a referent. So the referent of the folder is
not ﬁxed by its contents (as the referent for a folder about The mountain over there,
whatever it is, would be, or how the referent for a folder about The natural object over
there, whatever it is, would be), and the contents of this folder are still de re beliefs
Ralph has about Kilimanjaro. This was a bit roundabout, but we have seen that the
Problem of the Many threatens neither the possibility that Ralph is the subject of
true de re belief ascriptions, nor that he actually has de re beliefs.
4 Vague Objects
“I think the principle that to be is to be determinate is a priori, and hence
thatitisapriorithatthereisnoderevagueness”. (Jackson,2001, 657-658)
So do I. I also think there are a few arguments for this claim, though some of them
may seem question-begging to the determined defender of indeterminate objects.
Most of these arguments I will just mention, since I assume the reader has little desire
to see them detailed again. One argument is just that it is obvious that there is no
de re vagueness. Such ‘arguments’ are not worthless. The best argument that there
are no true contradictions is of just this form, as Priest (1998) shows. And it’s a good
argument! Secondly, Russell’s point that most arguments for de re vagueness involve
confusing what is represented with its representation still seems fair (Russell, 1923).
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Evans-Salmon argument against vague identities works, at least under the interpreta-
tion David Lewis gives it, and this makes it hard to see how there could be vague ob-
jects (Evans, 1978; Salmon, 1981; Lewis, 1988). Fourthly, Mark Heller (1996) argues
that we have to allow that referential terms are semantically vague. He says we have
to do so to explain context dependence but there are a few other explanatory projects
that would do just as well. Since semantic conceptions of vagueness can explain all
the data that are commonly taken to support ontological vagueness, it seems the-
oretically unparsimonious to postulate ontological vagueness too. That’s probably
enough, but let me add one more argument to the mix. Accepting that Kilimanjaro
isbeavaguematerialobjectdistinctfrombothKilimanjaro(+)andKilimanjaro(-)has
either metaphysical or logical costs. To prove this, I derive some rather unpleasant
metaphysical conclusions from the assumption that Kilimanjaro is vague. The proofs
will use some contentious principles of classical logic, but rejecting those, and hence
rejecting classical logic, would be a substantial logical cost. The most contentious
such principle used will be an instance of excluded middle: Sparky is or is not a part
of Kilimanjaro. I also assume that if for all x other than Sparky that x is a part of y
iff it is a part of z, then if Sparky is part of both y and z, or part of neither y nor z,
then y and z coincide. If someone can contrive a mereological theory that rejects this
principle, it will be immune to these arguments.
It is very plausible that material objects are individuated by the materials from
which they are composed, so any coincident material objects are identical. Prop-
erly understood, that is a good account of what it is to be material. The problem is
getting a proper understanding. Sider (1996) interprets it as saying that no two non-
identical material objects coincide right now. His project ends up running aground
over concerns about sentences involving counting, but his project, of ﬁnding a strong
interpretation of the principle is intuitively compelling. David (Lewis, 1986, Ch.
4) defends a slight weaker version: no two non-identical material objects coincide
at all times. Call this the strong composition principle (scp). The scp is (classically)
inconsistent with the hypothesis that Kilimanjaro is vague. If Sparky is part of Kili-
manjaro, then Kilimanjaro and Kilimanjaro(+) always coincide. If Sparky is not part
of Kilimanjaro then Kilimanjaro and Kilimanjaro(-) always coincide. Either way, two
non-identical objects always coincide, which the scp does not allow.
Some think the scp is refuted by Gibbard’s example of Lumpl and Goliath (Gib-
bard, 1975). The most natural response to Gibbard’s example is to weaken our indi-
viduationprincipleagain, thistimeto: notwonon-identicalmaterialobjectscoincide
in all worlds at all times. Call this the weak compositional principle (wcp). Since there
are worlds in which Goliath is composed of bronze, but Lumpl is still a lump of clay
in those worlds, Lumpl and Goliath do not refute the wcp. Some may think that
even the wcp is too strong7, but most would agree that if vague objects violated the
wcp, that would be a reason to believe they don’t exist.
Given a plausible metaphysical principle, which I call Crossover, vague objects
will violate the wcp. As shown above, Kilimanjaro actually (always) coincides with
7Kit Fine (1994) does exactly this.Many Many Problems 10
Kilimanjaro(+) or Kilimanjaro(-), but is not identical with either. Crossover is the
following principle:
Crossover For any actual material objects x and y there is an object z that coincides
with x in the actual world and y in all other worlds.
Given that arbitrary fusions exist, Crossover is entailed by, but does not entail, the
doctrine of arbitrary modal parts: that for any object o and world w, if o exists in
w then o has a part that only exists in w. But Crossover does not have the most
surprising consequence of the doctrine of arbitrary modal parts: that for any object
o there is an object that has essentially all the properties o actually has.
Let K1 be the object that coincides with Kilimanjaro in this world and Kiliman-
jaro(+) in all other worlds. Let K2 be the object that coincides with Kilimanjaro in
this world and Kilimanjaro(-) in all other worlds. If Sparky is part of Kilimanjaro
then K1 and Kilimanjaro(+) coincide in all worlds, but they are not identical, since
it is determinate that Sparky is actually part of Kilimanjaro(+) and not determinate
that it is part of K1. If Sparky is not part of Kilimanjaro then K2 and Kilimanjaro(-)
coincide in all worlds, but they are not identical, since it is determinate that Sparky
is not actually part of Kilimanjaro(-) and not determinate that it is not part of K2. Ei-
therway, wehaveaviolationofthewcp. Sothefollowingthreeclaimsare(classically)
inconsistent.
(a) Crossover.
(b) The wcp.
(c) Kilimanjaro is a vague object that indeterminately has Sparky as a part.
I think the ﬁrst two are highly plausible, so accepting (c) is costly. I already noted the
plausibility of the wcp, so the focus should be on Crossover. On Lewis’s account of
modality, it is clearly true, as is the stronger doctrine of arbitrary modal parts. On
a ﬁctionalist theory of modality based on Lewis’s account, it is still true, or at least
true in the ﬁction that we must adopt to make sense of modal talk. So the principle
is not without merits. And dialectically, opposing Crossover will be problematic for
the believer in vague objects. Either an object’s modal proﬁle is determined by its
categorical properties or it isn’t. If it is, then the wcp will entail the scp, so by the
above reasoning vague objects will be inconsistent with the wcp. If it is not, then it
is hard to see why an object could not have a completely arbitrary modal proﬁle, say
the proﬁle of some other ordinary material object. But that means Crossover is true,
and again we cannot have both the wcp and vague objects. Probably the best way
out for the believer in vague objects will be to short-circuit this reasoning by aban-
doning classical logic, presumably by declining to endorse the version of excluded
middle with which I started. But that is undoubtedly a costly move, particularly for
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5 McKinnon on Coins and Precisiﬁcations
Most of our discussions of the Problem of the Many relate to the vagueness in a single
singularterm, andasingleordinaryobject. AsMcKinnonremindsus, however, there
is not just one mountain in the world, there are many of them, and supervaluationists
are obliged to say plausible things about statements that are about many mountains.
Or, to focus on McKinnon’s example, we must not only have a plausible theory of
coins, but of coin exhibitions. These do raise distinctive problems. Imagine we have
an exhibition with, as we would ordinarily say, 2547 coins, each numbered in the cat-
alogue. So to each number n there correspond millions of coin-like entities, coin*s
in Sider’s helpful phrase (Sider, 2001), and each precisiﬁcation assigns a coin* to a
number. In general, Sider holds that something is an F* iff it has all the properties
necessary and sufﬁcient for being an F except the property of not massively overlap-
ping another F. There are some interesting questions about how independent these
assignments can be. If one precisiﬁcation assigns coin* c1 to n1, and another assigns
coin* c2 to n2 (distinct from n1) then is there a guaranteed to be a precisiﬁcation that
assigns both c1 to n1 and c2 to n2? In other words, may the precisiﬁcations of each nu-
meral (construed as a coin denotation) be independent of each other? The following
example suggests not. Say Cj is the set of coin*s that are possible precisiﬁcations of
j. This set may be vague because of higher–order vagueness, but set those difﬁculties
aside. If every member of C1728 has a duplicate in C1729, then presumably only pre-
cisiﬁcations that assigned duplicates to ‘1728’ and ‘1729’ would be admissible. If the
exhibition has two Edward I pennies on display to show the obverse and reverse, and
miraculously these coins are duplicates, such a situation will arise.
This case is fanciful, so we don’t know whether in reality the precisiﬁcations of
the numerals are independent. We probably can’t answer this question, but this is no
major concern. McKinnon has found a question which the supervaluationist should
feel a need to answer, but to which neither answer seems appropriate. Say that a
precisiﬁcation is principled iff there is some not-too-disjunctive property F such that
for each numeral n, the precisiﬁcation assigns to n the F-est coin* in Cn. If F does
not come in degrees, then the precisiﬁcation assigns to n the F in Cn. McKinnon’s
question to the supervaluationist is: Are all precisiﬁcations principled? He aims to
show either answering ‘yes’ or ‘no’ gets the supervaluationist in trouble. ‘Yes’ leads
to there being too few precisiﬁcations; ‘No’ leads to there being too many. Let us
look at these in order.
I have little to say for now on the ﬁrst horn of this dilemma. McKinnon’s survey
of principled precisiﬁcations only considers cases where F is intrinsic, and I postpone
for now investigation of extrinsic principles. Nevertheless, he does show that if F
must be intrinsic, then there are not enough principled precisiﬁcations to generate all
the indeterminacy our coin exhibit intuitively displays. The other horn is trickier.
A precisiﬁcation must not only assign a plausible coin* to each numeral, it must
do so in such a way that respects penumbral connections. McKinnon thinks that
unprincipled, or arbitrary precisiﬁcations, will violate (NAD) and (NAS).Many Many Problems 12
Non-Arbitrary Differences (NAD) For any coin and non-coin, there is a princi-
pled difference between them which forms the basis for one being a coin and
the other being a non-coin.
Non-Arbitrary Similarities (NAS) For any pair of coins, there is a principled sim-
ilarity between them which forms the basis for their both being coins.
McKinnon holds these are true, so they should be true on all precisiﬁcations, but
they are not true on unprincipled precisiﬁcations, so unprincipled precisiﬁcations
are unacceptable. The motivation for (NAD) and (NAS) is clear. When we list the
fundamental properties of the universe, we will not include being a coin. Coinness
doesn’t go that deep. So if some things are coins, they must be so in virtue of their
other properties. From this (NAD) and (NAS) follow.
The last step looks dubious. Consider any coin, for deﬁniteness say the referent
of ‘1728’, and a coin* that massively overlaps it. The coin* is not a coin, so (a) one
of these is a coin and the other is not, and (b) the minute differences between them
cannot form the basis for a distinction between coins and non-coins. Hence (NAD)
and (NAS) fail. At best, it seems, we can justify the following claims. If something
is a coin* and something else is not, then there is a principled difference between
them that makes one of them a coin* and the other not. Something is a coin iff it
is a coin* that does not excessively overlap a coin. If this is the best we can do at
deﬁning ‘coin’, then the prospects for a reductive physicalism about coins might look
a little dim, though this is no threat to a physicalism about coins that stays neutral
on the question of reduction. (I trust no reader is an anti-physicalist about coins, but
it is worth noting how vexing questions of reduction can get even when questions of
physicalism are settled.)
So I think this example refutes (NAD) and (NAS). Do I beg some questions here?
Well, my counterexample turns crucially on the existence of kinds of objects, mas-
sively overlapping coin*s, that some people reject, and indeed that some ﬁnd the
most objectionable aspect of the supervaluationist solution. But this gets the burden
of proof the wrong way around. I was not trying to refute (NAD) and (NAS). I just
aimed to parry an argument based on those principles. I am allowed to appeal to
aspects of my theory in doing so without begging questions. I do not want to rest
too much weight on this point, however, for issues to do with who bears the burden
of proof are rarely easily resolved, so let us move on.
My main response to McKinnon’s dilemma is another dilemma. If the principled
similarities and differences in (NAD) and (NAS) must be intrinsic properties, then
those principles are false, because there is no principled intrinsic difference between a
coin and a token, or a coin and a medal. If the principled similarities and differences
in (NAD) and (NAS) may be extrinsic properties, then those principles may be true,
but then the argument that there are not enough principled precisiﬁcations fail, since
now we must consider precisiﬁcations based on extrinsic principles. Let’s look at the
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A subway token is not a coin. Nor is a medal.8 But in their intrinsic respects, sub-
way tokens often resemble certain coins more than some coins resemble other coins.
Imagine we had a Boston subway token (which looks a bit like an American penny,
butlarger), anAmericanpenny, aBritish20ppiece(whichisroughlyheptagonal)and
an early Australian holey dollar (which has a hole in it). There is no non-disjunctive
classiﬁcation of these by intrinsic properties that includes the penny, the 20p piece
and the holey dollar in one group, and the subway token in the other. Any group
that includes the penny and the other coins will include the token as well. So if we
restrict attention to intrinsic similarities and differences, (NAD) and (NAS) are false.
There is a difference between these coins and the subway token. The coins were
producedwiththeintentofbeinglegaltender, thetokenwasnot. Perhapswecanﬁnd
a difference between coins and non-coins based on the intent of their creator.9 This
mightmake(NAD)and(NAS)true. Butnotethatgiventhetheoryofprecisiﬁcations
developed in section 3, on every precisiﬁcation, one and only one of the precisiﬁca-
tions of ‘1728’ will be the subject of an intention on the part of its manufacturer.
Just which of the objects is the subject of this intent will vary from precisiﬁcation
to precisiﬁcation, but there is only one on every precisiﬁcation. So we can say that
on every precisiﬁcation, the coin is the one where the intent of its creator was that
it be used in a certain way. Indeed, on any precisiﬁcation we may have antecedently
thought to have existed, we can show that precisiﬁcation to be principled by taking
F to be the property being created with intent of being used in a coin-like way.10 So
now we can say that restricting attention to the principled precisiﬁcations does not
unduly delimit the class of precisiﬁcations.
Let’s sum up. To argue against the possibility of unprincipled precisiﬁcations,
McKinnon needed to justify (NAD) and (NAS). But these are only true when we
allow ‘principled differences’ to include differences in creatorial intent. And if we do
that we can see that every prima facie admissible precisiﬁcation is principled, so we
can give an afﬁrmative answer to McKinnon’s question.
It might be objected that this move relies heavily on the fact that for many arte-
facts creative intent is constitutive of being the kind of thing that it is. But a Prob-
lem of the Many does not arise only for artefacts, so my solution does not generalise.
This is little reason for concern since McKinnon’s problem does not generalise either.
(NAD) and (NAS) are clearly false when we substitute ‘mountain’ for ‘coin’. Con-
sider a fairly typical case where it is indeterminate whether we have one mountain or
8Some people I have asked think tokens are coins, but no one thinks medals are coins, so if you (mistak-
enly) think tokens are coins, imagine all my subsequent arguments are phrased using medals rather than
tokens.
9Note that I say little here about what the intent of the creator must be. I don’t think that the intent
must always be to create legal tender. A ceremonial coin that is created, for example, to be tossed before
the start of a sporting match is still a coin, although it is not intended to be tender. But intent still matters.
If someone had made a duplicate of that ceremonial coin with the intent of awarding it as a medal to the
victorious captain, it would be a medal and not a coin.
10Because of the problems raised in the previous footnote, I will not try and say just what this intention
amounts to. There are complications when (a) the creator is a corporate entity rather than an individual
and (b) the coins are mass–produced rather than produced individually. But since the story is essentially
the same, I leave the gruesome details out here.Many Many Problems 14
two.11 In this case it might be not clear whether, for example, we have one mountain
with a southern and a northern peak, or two mountains, one of them a little north
of the other. Whether there is one mountain here or two, clearly the two peaks ex-
ist, and their fusion exists too. The real question is which of these three things is a
mountain. However this question is resolved, a substitution instance of (NAD) with
the two objects being the southern peak and the fusion of the two peaks will be false.
So in this case a relatively unprincipled precisiﬁcation will be acceptable. The point
here is that mountain*s that are not mountains exist (either the peaks or their fu-
sion will do as examples), and that sufﬁces to refute McKinnon’s alleged penumbral
connections and allow, in this case, a negative answer to his question.
6 Sorensen on Direct Reference
According to orthodoxy, we can use descriptions to determine the reference of names
without those descriptions becoming part of the meaning of the name. This, appar-
ently, is what happened when Leverrier introduced ‘Neptune’ to name, not merely
describe, the planet causing certain perturbations, and when someone introduced
‘Jack the Ripper’ to name, not merely describe, the person performing certain mur-
ders. So let us introduce ‘Acme’ as the name for the ﬁrst tributary of the river
Enigma. As Sorensen suggests, this can create certain problems.
When [explorers] ﬁrst travel up the river Enigma they ﬁnally reach the
ﬁrst pair of river branches. They name one branch ‘Sumo’ and the other
‘Wilt’. Sumo is shorter but more voluminous than Wilt. This makes
Sumo and Wilt borderline cases of ‘tributary’ ... ‘Acme’ deﬁnitely refers
to something, even though it is vague whether it refers to Sumo and
vague whether it refers to Wilt. (Sorensen, 2000, 180)
If ‘Acme’, ‘Sumo’ and ‘Wilt’ are all vague names related in this way, Sorensen thinks
the supervaluationist has a problem. The sentences ‘Acme is Sumo’ and ‘Acme is
Wilt’ both express propositions of the form hx = yi. For exactly one of them, x is y.
Since the proposition contains just the objects x and y (and the identity relation) but
not their route into the proposition, there is no vagueness in the proposition. Hence
there is no way to precisify either proposition. So a supervaluationist cannot explain
how these propositions are vague.
This is no problem for supervaluationism, since supervaluationism says that sen-
tences, not propositions, are vague. Indeed, most supervaluationists would say that no
proposition is ever vague. Thinking they are vague is just another instance of the
fallacy Russell identiﬁed: attributing properties of the representation to the entity, in
this case a proposition, represented.
But maybe there is a problem in the area. One natural way of spelling out the idea
that names directly refer to objects is to say that the meaning of a name is its referent.
And one quite plausible principle about precisiﬁcations is that precisiﬁcations must
11This case is rather important in the history of the problem, because its discussion in Quine (1960) is
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not change the meaning of a term, they may merely provide a meaning where none
exists. Now the supervaluationist has a problem. For it is true that one of Sorensen’s
identity sentences is true in virtue of its meaning, since its meaning determines that
it expresses a proposition of the form hx = xi. But each sentence is false on some
precisiﬁcations, so some precisiﬁcations change the meaning of the terms involved.
The best way to respond to this objection is simply to bite the bullet. We can
accept that some precisiﬁcations alter meanings provided we can provide some other
criteria for acceptability of precisiﬁcations. I offered one such proposal in section 2.
An acceptable precisiﬁcation takes the partial order more natural than, turns it into
a complete order without changing any of the relations that already exist, and uses
this new relation to generate meanings. If we proceed in this way it is possible, for
all we have hitherto said, that on every precisiﬁcation the proposition expressed by
‘Acme is Sumo’ will be of the form hx = yi, so just the named object, rather than the
method of naming, gets into the proposition. The central point is that since precisi-
ﬁcations apply to the processes that turn semantic intentions into meanings, rather
than to sentences with meanings, there is no guarantee they will preserve meanings.
But if we like directly referential theories of names we should think this perfectly nat-
ural. If names are directly referential then Sorensen’s argument that there are vague
sentences that are true in virtue of their meaning works. But this is consistent with
supervaluationism.
One challenge remains. If precisiﬁcations change meanings, why should we care
about them, or about what is true on all of them? This is not a new challenge; it is a
central plank in Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore’s (1996) attack on supervaluationism.
A simple response is just to say that we should care about precisiﬁcations because this
method delivers the right results in all core cases, and an intuitively plausible set of
results in contentious cases. This kind of instrumentalism about the foundations of a
theory is not always satisfying.12 But if that’s the biggest problem supervaluationists
have, they should be able to sleep a lot easier than the rest of us.
7 Conclusions and Confessions
I have spent a fair bit of time arguing that supervaluationism is not vulnerable to a
few challenges based on the Problem of the Many. Despite doing all this, I don’t
believe supervaluationism to be quite true. So why spend this time? Because the true
theory of vagueness will be a classical semantic theory, and everything I say about
supervaluationism above applies mutatis mutandis to all classical semantic theories.
I focussed on supervaluationism because it is more familiar and more popular, but I
need not have.
What is a classical semantic theory? That’s easy - it’s a theory that is both classical
and semantic. What is a classical theory? It is one that incorporates vagueness while
preserving classical logic. How much of classical logic must we preserve? That’s a
12The largest debate in the history of philosophy of economics concerned whether we could, or should,
be instrumentalists about the ideally rational agents at the core of mainstream microeconomic theory. See
Friedman(1953)fortheclassicstatementoftheinstrumentalistposition, andHausman(1992)forthemost
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hard question, though it is relevant to determining whether supervaluationism is (as
it is often advertised) a classical theory. Williamson (1994) notes that supervaluation-
ism does not preserve classical inference rules, and Hyde (1997) notes that it does
not preserve some classically valid multiple–conclusion sequents. Keefe (2000) argues
that neither of these constitutes an important deviation from classical logic. I’m in-
clined to disagree with Keefe on both points. Following Read (2000), I take it that the
bestresponse totheanti-classicalarguments inDummett(1991)takes theessentialfea-
turesofclassicallogictobeitsinferentialrulesasformulatedinamultiple–conclusion
logic. But we need not adjudicate this dispute here. Why should we want a classical
theory? The usual arguments for it are based on epistemic conservatism, and I think
these arguments are fairly compelling. I also think that no non–classical theory will
be able to provide a plausible account of quantiﬁcation.13
What is a semantic theory? It is one that makes vagueness a semantic phenome-
non. It is not necessarily one that makes vagueness a linguistic phenomenon. That
would be absurd in any case, since clearly some non–linguistic entities, maps, beliefs
and pictures for example, are vague. But the more general idea that vagueness is a
property only of representations is quite attractive. It links up well with the theory
of content Lewis outlines in “Languages and Language” - all Languages (in his tech-
nical sense) are precise, vagueness in natural language is a result of indecision about
which Language we are speaking.
Trenton Merricks (2001) argues against this picture, claiming that all semantic
vagueness (he says ‘linguistic’, but ignore that) must arise because of metaphysical
or epistemic vagueness. He claims that if (17) is vague, then so is (18), and (18)’s
vagueness must be either metaphysical or semantic.
(17) Harry is bald.
(18) ‘Bald’ describes Harry.
One might question the inference from (17)’s vagueness to (18) - on some superval-
uational theories if (17) is vague then (18) is false. But I will let that pass, for there
is a simpler problem in the argument. Merricks claims that if (18) is vague, then
it is vague whether ‘Bald’ has the property describing Harry, and this is a kind of
metaphysical vagueness. It is hard to see how this follows. If there is metaphysical
vagueness, there is presumably some object o and some property F such that it is
vague whether the object has the property. Presumably the object here is the word
‘bald’ and the property is describing Harry. But words alone do not have properties
like describing Harry. At best, words in languages do so. So maybe the object can be
the ordered pair h‘Bald’,li, where l is a language. But which one? Not one of Lewis’s
Languages, for then it is determinate whether <‘Bald’, l> has the property describing
Harry. So maybe a natural language, perhaps English! But it is doubly unclear that
English is an object. First, it is unclear whether we should reify natural languages
to such a degree that we accept that ‘English’ refers to anything at all. Secondly, if
we say ‘English’ does refer, why not say that it refers to one of Lewis’s Languages,
13See the last section of Weatherson (2005) for a detailed defence of this claim.Many Many Problems 17
thought it is vague which one? That way we can say that the sentence ‘Bald’ in En-
glish describes Harry is vague without there being any object that vaguely instantiates
a property. Now on a supervaluational theory this approach may have the unwanted
consequence that “English is a precise language” is true, since it is true on all precisi-
ﬁcations. It does not seem that this problem for the supervaluationist generalises to
be a problem for all semantic theories of vagueness, so Merricks has raised no general
problem for semantic theories of vagueness. (The problem for the supervaluationist
here is not new. For some discussion see Lewis’s response, in “Many, but Almost
One” to the objection, there attributed to Kripke, that the supervaluationist account
makes it true that all words are precise.)
If we have a classical semantic theory that provides a concept of determinateness,
then we can deﬁne acceptable precisiﬁcations as maximal consistent extensions of
the set of determinate truths. Given that, it follows pretty quickly that determinate
truth implies truth on all precisiﬁcations. And this is sufﬁcient for the major objec-
tions canvassed above to get a foothold, and hence be worthy of response, though as
we have seen none of them will ultimately succeed. Still, our theory may differ from
supervaluationism in many ways. For one thing, it might explain determinateness
in ways quite different from those in supervaluationism. For example, the theory
in Field (2000) is a classical semantic theory14, but it clearly goes beyond supervalua-
tional theory because it has an interesting, if ultimately ﬂawed, explanation of deter-
minateness in terms of Shafer functions. Other classical semantic theories may differ
from supervaluationism by providing distinctive theories of higher order vagueness.
The most promising research programs in vagueness are within the classical se-
mantic framework. Like all research programs, these programs need a defensive com-
ponent, to fend off potential refutations and crisis. This avoids unwanted crises in
the program, and as we have seen here we can learn a bit from seeing how to defend
against certain attacks. There will undoubtedly be more challenges in the time ahead,
but for now the moves in this paper brings the defensive side of the program up to
date.
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